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HETEROGENEOUS GOVERNMENT SPENDING MULTIPLIERS
IN THE ERA SURROUNDING THE GREAT RECESSION
Marco Bernardini, Selien De Schryder, and Gert Peersman*
Abstract—We use novel quarterly data of U.S. states to examine the dy-
namics of relative spending multipliers in the decade surrounding the Great
Recession. While multipliers were around 1 in expansions, they reached
values above 4 when a state was in a recession. Also a high (low) degree
of household indebtedness augmented (lowered) a state’s multiplier by 0.5
in expansions and 2 in recessions. We further document modest positive
spillover effects across states and show that a mere redistribution of spend-
ing across states also had a significant influence on the aggregate U.S.
economy due to cross-state heterogeneity of the effects.
I. Introduction
THE impact of changes in government expenditureson economic activity has been a central question of
macroeconomic research for many years. In this context, an
increasing number of studies have used state-level panel data
to estimate the effects of government purchases on local
activity—so-called relative or local fiscal multipliers (Naka-
mura & Steinsson, 2014; Shoag, 2013; Brückner & Tuladhar,
2014; Serrato & Wingender, 2016; Dupor & Guerrero, 2017).
An advantage of this approach is that disaggregate data aug-
ment the number of observations and variation in the data
substantially, which could increase the precision of the esti-
mates. A drawback is that the results are not representative
for the aggregate effects. In essence, these studies estimate
relative multipliers across regions, holding national effects of
fiscal policy constant (Ramey, 2011b).
Relative fiscal multipliers are nevertheless important in
their own right. In particular, a better understanding of rela-
tive multipliers is necessary for policymakers since business
cycle fluctuations could be highly diverse across regions and
states. For example, annual real GDP growth in Michigan
and Arizona collapsed by respectively −8.1% and −8.2%
in 2009. At the same time, New York and Alaska recorded
positive growth rates of 2.1% and 9.1%, respectively. In a cur-
rency union, local fiscal policy and redistribution of resources
across subnational entities are among the few remaining pol-
icy tools for stabilizing local business cycles and smoothing
asymmetric shocks.
Notwithstanding their relevance, existing studies on rela-
tive multipliers are of only limited use for policymakers in
practice. Specifically, such multipliers have so far been esti-
mated with annual or lower-frequency data. Given that there
are implementation lags for fiscal policy and recessions typ-
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ically last less than one year, it is not clear whether and how
these annual multipliers are informative for dampening local
economic fluctuations. Furthermore, due to the annual fre-
quency of state-level data, state relative multipliers are typi-
cally estimated over very long sample periods (e.g., 1966 to
2006 in Nakamura & Steinsson, 2014; 1951 to 2014 in Du-
por & Guerrero, 2017). In the meantime, however, it is well
known that fiscal multipliers are not structural constants and
may depend on various features of the economy that vary over
time and across states (Hall, 2009). Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012a, 2012b) have, for example, documented that
increases of national government purchases are much more
effective in recessions than expansions, while Bernardini and
Peersman (2018) find considerably larger aggregate multipli-
ers in periods of private debt overhang. Similarly, Nakamura
and Steinsson (2014) find larger relative multipliers in high-
unemployment periods, whereas a recent study of Demyanyk,
Loutskina, and Murphy (2017) identify larger relative multi-
pliers in core-based statistical area (CBSA) geographies with
higher consumer debt. These findings also receive ample the-
oretical support (Michaillat, 2014; Canzoneri et al., 2016; Eg-
gertsson & Krugman, 2012; Andrés, Boscá, & Ferri, 2015).
Relative multipliers for individual states at a specific moment
in time may hence substantially diverge from the average ten-
dency. Accordingly, average relative multipliers are probably
not very helpful for policymakers in real time, such as in the
midst of the recent financial crisis. Finally, average relative
multipliers are not useful to assess the national benefits of
mere redistributions of government spending across regions;
the aggregate effects of such policies on economic activity
are by construction neutral.
In this study, we try to fill several of these gaps. More pre-
cisely, using a novel quarterly data set of U.S. states over the
sample period 2005Q1 to 2015Q4, we estimate state relative
government spending multipliers and the key determinants
of the multipliers in the era surrounding the Great Recession
with instrumental variables panel local projection methods in
the spirit of Ramey and Zubairy (2018). This period is par-
ticularly interesting given the policy and academic debates
on the question whether the effects of fiscal policy were dif-
ferent than in normal times (Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012;
Blanchard & Leigh, 2013; Ramey & Zubairy, 2018) and
the fact that this episode has been characterized by a sub-
stantial implicit relocation of government resources across
states.1 The data set is entirely based on publicly available
1For example, Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) document that the level of
federal money received by states in the context of the ARRA’s Medicaid
match program between 2009 and June 2010 varied between $103 per per-
son aged 16 or older in Utah and $507 in Washington, DC, with an in-
terquartile range of $114.
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information that has recently been released. Specifically, we
use the Regional Economic Accounts database of the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) to obtain state-level GDP and
government value added at a quarterly frequency, and the
Consumer Credit Panel data set of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York (FRBNY) to collect state-level household debt
series.
These data sources have several advantages to tackle the
issues. First, they allow us to estimate relative government
spending multipliers at a quarterly frequency and analyze the
macroeconomic dynamics at different horizons following the
fiscal policy impulse. Second, due to the large number of ob-
servations compared to annual data sets, the multipliers can
be estimated over shorter periods and still have accurate es-
timates. We demonstrate that this is at least the case for the
period surrounding the Great Recession, which has been an
era with substantial variation in government spending. Third,
the data set allows us to investigate the role of several poten-
tial determinants for the size and dynamics of relative mul-
tipliers. In particular, we examine the influence of spillover
effects across states and assess whether relative multipliers
in this period depended on the stance of the business cycle or
the amount of private debt, or the interaction of both condi-
tions at the state level. Since business cycles and household
debt have varied substantially across states during this period,
there is again a lot of heterogeneity in the data that can be
exploited to pin down their influence on multipliers. Finally,
a quarterly data set for state-specific government value added
and GDP allows us to apply the popular Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002) approach to directly identify exogenous shocks
to government expenditures rather than relying on indirect
methods such as the Bartik (1991) instrument approach. In
sum, the results of our quarterly estimations should provide
useful insights for fiscal policymakers and the stabilization
of state business cycles, as well as a better understanding of
the dynamics and determinants of multipliers. The latter is,
in turn, helpful to assess the national consequences of fiscal
redistribution policies.
The estimations reveal several new insights about relative
multipliers. First, state multipliers were on average quite sim-
ilar to those that have been reported for the decades preced-
ing the crisis (e.g., Nakamura & Steinsson, 2014). We find a
benchmark average cumultative multiplier of approximately
1.3 in the impact quarter. Government spending is thus a
powerful tool for a relatively swift stabilization of local busi-
ness cycles. The size of average multipliers also appears to
be stable at longer horizons, while we find moderate positive
spillover effects on other states—in particular, trade partners.
Furthermore, we find substantial heterogeneity in the mag-
nitude and the dynamics of relative multipliers across states
and over time. Specifically, relative multipliers turned out to
be larger, reaching values around 2 when a state was in a
recession at the moment of the shift in government expendi-
tures and even above 4 in deep recessions. Multipliers also
appear to be more persistent in recessions than expansions.
In addition, the magnitude of the multiplier was significantly
influenced by the state’s private indebtedness. A 1 standard
deviation higher (lower) household debt-to-income ratio was
associated with an increase (decline) of the state’s multiplier
by approximately 0.5 in expansions and up to 2 when the state
was in a recession. These findings suggest that the business
cycle and degree of private indebtedness of U.S. states are
key drivers of relative multipliers and should be taken into
account when designing fiscal policies at regional levels.
Can we learn something about the aggregate effects of
fiscal redistribution policies? The results suggest that redistri-
bution of government expenditures from a state with a grow-
ing economy or low household debt levels to states that are
in a recession or have relatively high household debt ratios,
and hence larger relative multipliers, should stimulate aggre-
gate economic activity. To test this conjecture more directly,
we construct a simple indicator that proxies changes in the
regional distribution of aggregate U.S. government spend-
ing toward states in a recession or states with high house-
hold debt ratios. We then estimate the macroeconomic ef-
fects of innovations to this indicator, controlling for changes
in aggregate government expenditures. We find that shifts in
the distribution of spending toward states that are potentially
more sensitive to fiscal policy indeed had a significant posi-
tive effect on aggregate U.S. real GDP. These results indicate
that mere targeted redistributions of government expenditures
across states can be beneficial for the aggregate economy
as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we describe our quarterly data set, present the results for the
average (linear) state relative multipliers in the period sur-
rounding the Great Recession, and evaluate spillover effects
across states. Section III examines the underlying drivers of
state multipliers, while section IV analyzes whether a sim-
ple redistribution of government spending across states could
also influence the aggregate economy. Section V concludes.
II. Average Relative Multipliers
A. Quarterly State-Level Data Set
The analysis in this paper is based on a novel quarterly
panel data set at the level of U.S. states, covering the fifty
states and the District of Colombia. The data set draws en-
tirely from publicly available and recently released time se-
ries for the individual states. We use the Regional Economic
Accounts (REA) of the BEA to collect state-level quarterly
data on GDP and its main components. The sample period,
based on data availability, is 2005Q1 to 2015Q4, which al-
lows us to estimate the dynamics of relative government
spending multipliers across states during the period surround-
ing the Great Recession. This is an era that receives a lot of
attention in the fiscal policy literature. For example, Blan-
chard and Leigh (2013) have shown that aggregate govern-
ment spending multipliers were much larger during the Great
Recession than in normal times. In section III, we merge
the data with household debt information obtained from the
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FIGURE 1.—CROSS-STATE VARIATION OF GOVERNMENT VALUE ADDED AND GDP OVER TIME
The green lines show the cross-state averages of the quarterly growth rates of real government value added and real GDP over time. The bands show different percentile intervals: 35th–65th (30%), 20th–80th (60%),
and 5th–95th (90%).
Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) of the FRBNY to examine the
determinants of the multipliers during this period.2
The variables from the REA that will be used to estimate
government spending multipliers are state-level government
value added and gross domestic product. Notice that state-
level government value added comprises compensation of
government employees and consumption of government cap-
ital. Examples are education, policy, and military personnel
services. Government value added is a subcomponent of gov-
ernment purchases that also includes government purchases
of goods from the private sector, such as aircraft carriers or
tanks.3 The advantage of this component is that it implies that
2The REA-BEA quarterly state-level data were officially released in De-
cember 2015, and the CCP-FRBNY data were publicly released in De-
cember 2016. See the data appendix for detailed information on the exact
sources of the data. We are not aware of studies that have used the REA-BEA
data yet. The CCP-FRBNY data have been used by Albuquerque (2017) to
study the role of monetary policy for household debt cycles.
3See Ramey (2013) for a detailed explanation and discussion of this
aggregate.
government production and the government spending shocks
that we will identify effectively took place in the state and
not elsewhere, while all other production in the state is car-
ried out by the private sector. State-level GDP covers the total
contribution of private and public sectors to overall GDP and
can be seen as the state counterpart of national GDP. Another
advantage is that the REA data contain both nominal and real
series for each state. Hence, we do not have to use national
(aggregate) price indexes or construct regional inflation mea-
sures to deflate nominal variables.4
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the cross-sectional aver-
ages of both real aggregates over time, whereas the shaded
gray areas represent respectively the 35th to 65th (dark gray),
4In the estimations, we use the real series of both variables directly. Hence,
in contrast to some other studies, we do not use the GDP deflator to deflate
government value added. The reason is that the GDP deflator of several oil-
producing states is characterized by large swings that are the consequence
of oil price fluctuations, which would result in implausible shifts of real
government value added.
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the 20th to 80th, and the 5th to 95th percentiles (light gray) of
the individual states. Besides nonnegligible average volatility
over time, the graphs reveal considerable cross-state hetero-
geneity in the signs and magnitudes of the changes in both
aggregates within the sample period. In addition to the quar-
terly frequency, the large extent of variation coming from the
use of disaggregate data is a key advantage of our data set to
obtain precise and reliable relative spending multipliers for
this period.
B. Methodology
We examine the dynamics of the cumulative government
spending multiplier, which is the ratio of the cumulative
changes in GDP and government spending at time t + h in-
duced by a government spending shock at time t . By tak-
ing into account the entire volume of government spending
between t and t + h induced by the initial shock, this indi-
cator is a fair measure of the medium-run effects of fiscal
shocks on economic activity. Following Ramey (2016), we
directly estimate the cumulative multiplier over a two-year
horizon (H = 8) using an instrumental variables model based









+ γh(L) ˜ctrit + αih + δth + εit+h
(1)
For h = 0, . . . , H , the cumulative path of GDP ∑hl=0 ỹit+l
in a U.S. state i between t and t + h is regressed on the cu-
mulative path of government spending
∑h
l=0 g̃it+l , which is
instrumented by a government spending shock that we dis-
cuss below. ˜ctrit is a set of predetermined control variables
that includes four lags of state-level government production
and state-level GDP, while αih and δth are state-specific and
time-specific effects, respectively. εit+h captures the residual
variation. The regression of equation (1) provides a direct es-
timate of the cumulative multiplier at each horizon, βh, and
its statistical uncertainty. Furthermore, fixed effects allow us
to control for state-specific features that are constant over
time (e.g., institutional or structural characteristics), while
time effects control for aggregate shocks and common poli-
cies such as changes in monetary policy, aggregate taxes, and
national government spending. The use of time effects im-
plies that we estimate relative state multipliers, which should
be interpreted as the effects of an increase in government ex-
penditures in one state relative to another on relative output
(Nakamura & Steinsson, 2014). Relative multipliers are thus
conceptually different from aggregate multipliers.





where vit is a generic income variable in real terms and y∗it−1
is lagged potential output.5 This specification guarantees that
government spending and GDP are in the same units, which
allows us to interpret βh as a multiplier (i.e., not as an elastic-
ity). The use of an ex ante transformation not only provides a
direct estimate of the multiplier, it also minimizes the poten-
tial bias associated with the alternative ex post conversion of
the estimated elasticity in a multiplier. As Ramey and Zubairy
(2018), noted ex post transformations are sensible only when
the level of government spending as a share of GDP (G/Y )
is fairly constant in the sample. Similar to the case of time
series models using historical data, which have to deal with
a considerable increase in the share of government spending
around World War II, panel models using disaggregate U.S.
data have to deal with the fact that the share might be highly
different across states. In our sample, the spending shares
indeed range between 9% and 37%, with a cross-sectional
average of 14%.
An advantage of the quarterly frequency of the state-level
data set is that it allows us to apply the popular Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) approach to identify exogenous government
spending shocks. This method exploits the timing assumption
that due to the presence of political and institutional delays,
the amount of government expenditures is predetermined and
cannot react instantaneously to macroeconomic shocks. For
quarterly data and government value added, this assumption
is plausible. Most states, for example, have an annual ap-
propriation process for their budgets, even though with the
option of midyear revisions in case of expected shortfalls.
The relative government spending shocks can be obtained
by estimating state-level rules for government value added,
where government value added in an individual state is as-
sumed to depend on a set of predetermined variables ctrit ,
state-specific and time-specific effects, and an autonomous
shock (shockit ):
g̃it = κ(L) ˜ctrit + αi + δt + shockit . (2)
Similar to equation (1), the set of predetermined variables
in equation (2) has four lags of state-level government value
added and GDP. The residuals of state-level rules for gov-
ernment value added are more precise measures of local
government spending than instruments based on the often-
applied Bartik (1991) allocation approach, which measures
local spending shocks as national changes in, say, military
spending scaled by a state-specific scaling factor.6 In con-
trast to national (military) spending that is distributed across
states or mere transfers from the federal government to the
regions, a drawback of state-level government value added
5l+1vit+l = vit+l − vit−1. Potential output is defined as the Hodrick-
Prescott filtered trend of state-level GDP with λ set to 1e + 06. An alter-
native data transformation to obtain direct multiplier estimates is the one
used by Gordon and Krenn (2010). As documented by Ramey and Zubairy
(2018), for example, results are typically very similar.
6For example, Dupor and Guerrero (2017) use the ratio of a state’s share
of national spending divided by the state’s share of national income as a
scaling factor to obtain an instrument for local shocks.
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is that the expenditures are funded by the federal as well as
the state budget, which implies that local taxes do not neces-
sarily remain constant in response to the shocks. In section
IID, we assess the robustness of the results for a specification
that relies on scaled federal spending shocks. Notice also that
a caveat of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) method is that
the shocks may be anticipated by the private sector. Ramey
(2011a) has shown that this is the case for the United States
at the aggregate (national) level.
We estimate equations (1) and (2) using the fixed-effects
estimator, which allows for heterogeneous constants across
states but assumes homogeneous slope coefficients. As a sen-
sitivity check, in section IID, also report the results of a mean
group estimation that allows for heterogeneous slopes. The
standard errors in all the estimations are based on the Driscoll
and Kraay (1998) correction, which takes into account the
potential residual correlation across U.S. states, as well as
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity among the residuals
over time. The standard errors of the multiplier are further
adjusted in order to take into account the uncertainty related
to the first stage regression. To allow for a comparison of
the estimates across horizons h, we hold the sample con-
stant (we use the sample for the longest horizon, H = 8),
leaving us with a balanced macropanel consisting of 1,581
observations.
C. Estimation Results
The benchmark results are shown in figure 2. The green
solid line represents the size of the cumulative relative mul-
tiplier βh over a horizon of eight quarters. The dark and light
shadings are the 68% and 90% Driscoll-Kraay adjusted con-
fidence bands, respectively. The panels of figure 2 show the
cumulative multiplier, as well as the impulse responses of
government spending and real GDP. The top-right panel dis-
plays the Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic for weak instruments,
which is equivalent to the Montiel-Olea-Pflueger statistic in
case of a just-identified specification.7 Overall, the multipli-
ers are estimated with good precision, and the instrumental
regressions are well identified.
Although it is difficult to compare our quarterly cumula-
tive spending multipliers with other studies, a first interesting
observation is that state relative multipliers during the decade
surrounding the Great Recession were on average not very
different from those reported in the literature for the decades
before the financial crisis. We obtain a relative multiplier,
which is on average 1.3 during the first year and 1.2 during
the first two years. As a benchmark, Nakamura and Steins-
son (2014) regress two-year changes in output on two-year
changes in spending and find relative multipliers that range
between 1.3 and 1.9 for the period 1966 to 2006 depending
7The statistics test the null hypothesis that the TSLS bias exceeds 10%
of the OLS bias. In the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation,
the threshold is 19.7 for the 10% critical value and 23.1 for the 5% critical
value (Montiel Olea, & Pflueger, 2013). Note that we impose an upper
bound (dashed line) in the figure since the statistic is infinite on impact.
on the model specification. Serrato and Wingender (2016)
report values in the range of 1.7 and 2.2 based on an analy-
sis of U.S. counties and four-year intervals during the 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s. Furthermore, Shoag (2013) and Demyanyk
et al. (2017) present an estimate of 1.4 and 1.5 for the fiscal
multiplier in U.S. states for post-2000 samples.
In contrast to studies using regional annual or lower-
frequency data, the quarterly frequency of our data series
can shed light on the within-year dynamics of cumulative
multipliers. The impact multiplier is 1.3. This implies a $0.3
increase (decrease) in relative private sector production for
every $1.00 increase (decrease) in relative government pro-
duction. State government spending thus has an instantaneous
and sizable impact on local economic activity, making it a
powerful tool for a relatively rapid stabilization of local busi-
ness cycles. The size of the cumulative multiplier also ap-
pears to be rather stable at longer horizons (the point estimate
ranges between 1.1 and 1.3 during the two years), which sug-
gests that fiscal policy may also be efficient to smooth asym-
metric evolutions in states’ business cycles in the medium
run. A closer look at the impulse responses of government
value added and GDP reveals that the shocks in the sam-
ple have been characterized by a persistent rise in govern-
ment value added, resulting in a persistent increase of real
GDP, which explains the stability of the multiplier at longer
horizons.
D. Sensitivity of Benchmark Multipliers
As discussed in section IIB, a caveat of the baseline cumu-
lative multipliers is that government value added is a combi-
nation of state- and federal-funded government expenditures.
In particular, the former may be associated with changes in
local taxes or debt, which could influence the size of the mul-
tiplier. In contrast to the national accounts data of the BEA,
a limitation of the REA data set is that such a decomposition
is not available for individual states; only total government
value added is reported for each state. As a robustness check,
we therefore also use an instrumental variable (IV) approach
that explores differences in the responsiveness of state-level
government value added to national government value added
funded by the federal government (federal government value
added) to identify state-level spending shocks. The approach
is partly borrowed from Nakamura and Steinsson (2014)
and intrinsically similar to the Bartik (1991) method.8 More
specifically, in a first step, we isolate the autonomous vari-
ation in federal government value added using an aggregate
policy rule that is similar to equation (2):
g̃natt = ϕ(L) ˜ctrnatt + shocknatt . (3)
8In their baseline approach, Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) first regress
changes in state military procurement on fixed effects and changes in ag-
gregate military procurement, allowing for different sensitivities across
states. The fitted values are then used as an instrument for changes in state
spending.
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FIGURE 2.—AVERAGE RELATIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING MULTIPLIERS
The top panel shows the cumulative relative fiscal multiplier and the related F -statistics over a two-year horizon. The dashed part of the blue line represents the imposed upper bound on impact since the F -statistic is
then infinite. The bottom panel shows the underlying impulse responses of government value added and gross domestic product. Bands are 68% (dark) and 90% (light) confidence intervals.
In the next step, we regress changes in state-level govern-
ment value added on the federal government spending shock,
allowing for a heterogeneous impact of the national shock
across states and state-specific constants:
g̃it = αi + θishocknatt + μit . (4)
This yields scaled federal spending shocks for each state
(θishock
nat
t ) that can be used to estimate local multipliers.
The identifying assumption is that federal government value
added does not systematically react within one quarter to
economic conditions of states that receive a disproportionate
amount of national spending, a weaker assumption than our
baseline approach.
The scaled federal shocks should also accommodate the
possible concern that balanced budget requirements at the
state level influence the results. States with stricter budget
requirements, for example, might in general react differently
to fiscal conditions than other states (Poterba, 1994; Bohn &
Inman, 1996), while Cashin et al. (2017) find a sharp reduc-
tion in state and local government purchases in the postcrisis
recovery due to balanced budget rules. A strict budget re-
quirement may also make government spending of an indi-
vidual state sensitive to changes in state output within one
quarter, which would be at odds with our baseline Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) identifying assumption.9
9The key question is whether this response is within one quarter. For exam-
ple, Costello, Petacchi, and Weber (2017) document that taxes and spend-
ing of states with strict balanced budget requirements do not react differ-
ently within the first year relative to states with weak budget requirements.
This is only the case in the subsequent year. In general, it is hard to find
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FIGURE 3.—SENSITIVITY OF BENCHMARK MULTIPLIERS
Bands are 68% (dark) and 90% (light) confidence intervals. The dashed black lines are the point estimates of the benchmark results.
Figure 3 shows the average cumulative relative multipliers
that are estimated using the alternative scaled national gov-
ernment spending shocks. The graphs also include the point
estimates of the benchmark results for comparison. The im-
pact multiplier is around 2 and larger than the benchmark mul-
tiplier, but decreases below 1 at longer horizons. A caveat of
(anecdotal) evidence that states do react within the quarter to a projected
deficit or changes in revenues. Notice also that there is considerable varia-
tion in the implementation of balanced budget requirements, which typically
apply to the general fund budget but exclude, for example, state-funded spe-
cial revenue funds and federal funds. Furthermore, state governments are
quite creative to temporarily alleviate the requirements, for example, by
using asset sales or interfund transfers of money. In fact, when we split the
sample between states that have strict and weak balanced budget require-
ments, we find similar relative multipliers (results available on request).
Hence, it is not likely that different budget requirements have an impact on
our benchmark results.
these results, however, is that the point estimates are quite im-
precise. The lower F -statistics also point to a lower strength
of the instrument and potential weak instrument bias. Due to
this imprecision and the fact that the results are not very dif-
ferent from our benchmark approach, we will proceed only
with the latter in the balance of the paper.
As another robustness check, figure 3 shows cumulative
relative multipliers that are estimated with a mean group
approach, which allows for cross-state heterogeneity in the
slope coefficients. Given that we find considerable heteroge-
neous multipliers in section III, the assumption of homoge-
neous slopes of the fixed-effects estimator may distort the re-
sults. In order to estimate relative cumulative multipliers and
control for common shocks, we orthogonalize the series to
state-specific and time-specific effects before performing the
state-by-state estimations. As can be observed in the figure,
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the point estimates of the cumulative multiplier are somewhat
larger and qualitatively similar to the benchmark results; the
multiplier ranges between 1.6 and 1.8 depending on the hori-
zon. Notice, however, that the mean group estimator requires
a relatively long time dimension, which is a limitation of the
state-level data set. This is even more the case for the large
number of coefficients that we need to estimate in section III.
In addition, individual state-level regressions lack sufficient
variation in the data to properly identify these (interaction)
coefficients, which heavily rely on the cross-section dimen-
sion of the data set (e.g., household debt). In the remainder of
the paper, we therefore use only the fixed-effects estimator.
Overall, we conclude that our benchmark results offer robust
estimates of average state-level cumulative multipliers.
E. Fiscal Policy Spillovers across States
Since we are estimating the impact of government spend-
ing on the relative output of states, the above results could
under- or overestimate the local (and total) effects of govern-
ment spending on economic activity if there are positive or
negative spillovers across states. For example, an increase in
output in one state associated with lower activity elsewhere
could also induce a large shift in relative output (Cochrane,
2012). This could, for example, be the case if a rise in out-
put in one state induces workers to immigrate from other
states. An implicit premise of estimating relative multipli-
ers is also that the individual state receives spending, but
other states essentially have to partly pay for it. These fea-
tures can entail negative spillovers effects, in which case the
estimated multipliers are an overestimation of the total ef-
fects of spending on a state. On the other hand, there could
be positive spillovers to other states through trade, which
leads to an underestimation of the impact on local and aggre-
gate economic activity. Dupor and Guerrero (2017) indeed
find small, positive spillovers between states and their major
trading partner, while Serrato and Wingender (2016) do not
find sizable spillover effects across neighboring U.S. coun-
ties. Conversely, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) find
fiscal spillovers through trade among OECD countries that
are statistically and economically significant.
In this section, we assess whether trade linkages affect the
relative multipliers that we have estimated and whether trade
partners benefit from government spending. In the spirit of
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), we first construct for
each state a trade-weighted sum of government value added
and government spending shocks in partner states. For details
of the construction, we refer to the data appendix. We then
extend equation (1) with the trade-weighted sum of govern-
ment value added.10 Figure 4a shows the estimated cumula-
tive multipliers and cumulative trade-weighted spillover ef-
10We now have two shocks (own state and other state’s spending shocks)
that are used as instruments for cumulative government spending by state
i and its trade partners. Notice also that we do not report F -statistics for
possible weak instruments because this test applies only for IV regressions
with one endogenous regressor.
fects. A first important observation is that the cumulative mul-
tipliers of own-spending shocks are similar to the benchmark
average multipliers. Our results are thus robust for this ex-
tension.11 Furthermore, figure 4a reveals a positive spillover
effect from spending shocks in trade partners. The contem-
poraneous spillover impact is even 0.6. However, the positive
spillover effects vanish after one quarter. Notice that the un-
certainty of the estimates is also quite high.
As an alternative, similar to Dupor and Guerrero (2017),
figure 4b shows the own multiplier and spillover effects from
a spending shock in the main trading partner. For 47 states
(including the District of Columbia), the major trade partner
shares borders. Again, we find moderate positive spillovers,
which confirms a favorable trade channel. Does this imply
that non–trade partners have to bear the costs? This does not
seem to be the case. Specifically, figure 4c also shows the
impact of a government spending shock in the least impor-
tant trade partner, which turns out to be insignificant. Overall,
these results suggest that there are likely positive spillover ef-
fects across states through trade, albeit quite moderate, while
other states do not have to carry the burden of local spending
shocks. The average multipliers that we have documented in
section IIC are hence a lower bound of the local effects of
government spending.
III. Heterogeneous Relative Multipliers
Fiscal multipliers that are estimated in empirical studies
measure the effectiveness of an average government spend-
ing shock within the sample period. However, the actual size
of the multiplier in a specific state at a particular time may
significantly differ from the general tendency. Specifically,
multipliers are not structural characteristics of the macroe-
conomy, and their size can differ over time and across states.
From a policy perspective, in the presence of multipliers that
change depending on underlying conditions of the economy,
linear estimates like the ones shown in section IIC may pro-
vide a misguided source of information. In this section, we
assess the relevance of some key possible determinants of
relative fiscal multipliers across states.
A. Determinants of Relative Multipliers
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) have argued that the failure to
recognize an upward change in the magnitude of fiscal mul-
tipliers during the Great Recession and its aftermath has sig-
nificantly contributed to the growth forecast errors that policy
institutions make. Accordingly, the literature has shown in-
creasing interest in the analysis of how the effectiveness of fis-
cal policy may change under certain economic and financial
conditions. The amount of private debt accumulation prior to
11This is not the case for the spillover effects. Specifically, when own-
government spending is not included in this estimation, we find a much
higher spillover multiplier of approximately 1.5 on impact, which can be
explained by a positive correlation between own-spending shocks and those
of trade partners.
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FIGURE 4.—FISCAL POLICY SPILLOVERS
Bands are 68% (dark) and 90% (light) confidence intervals.
the start of the Great Recession and the impact of leverage on
the recession have directed researchers toward exploring the
role played by the business cycle and the degree of private in-
debtedness in affecting the transmission of fiscal policy. We
examine whether both conditions, as well as their interaction,
matter for relative multipliers across states.12
12Other popular determinants of multipliers that have been documented
in the literature are the stance of monetary policy (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
Business cycle. The influence of the business cycle on fis-
cal multipliers reflects the Keynesian argument that govern-
ment spending is more effective during periods of economic
slack. From a theoretical perspective, Michaillat (2014) ob-
tains countercyclical multipliers based on a model where the
& Rebelo, 2011) or the level of government debt (Perotti, 1999). However,
both features cannot explain the magnitude of relative multipliers. One
of the advantages of disaggregate data is hence that these features cannot
distort the estimations of the role of the other determinants.
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FIGURE 5.—CROSS-STATE VARIATION OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OVER TIME
The bar graph depicts the percentage of U.S. states in recession (deep recession) in each quarter of our sample. The total number of recessions (deep recessions) in our sample is 406 (118), for a total of 1,581
observations. The green line shows the cross-state average of household debt over time. The bands show different percentile intervals: 35th–65th (30%), 20th–80th (60%), and 5th–95th (90%).
presence of search-and-matching features in the labor market
leads to less crowding out of private sector resources in re-
cessions. Canzoneri et al. (2016) retrieve stronger multipliers
in recessions as a result of countercyclical financial frictions
and credit constraints in a macromodel with costly financial
intermediation, which results in a stronger financial accelera-
tor in recessions. The strength of the financial accelerator and
the magnitude of the multiplier depend on the spread between
borrowing and lending at the moment of the fiscal impulse,
that is, the intensity of financial frictions. Hence, this mecha-
nism might have been particularly important in the financial
crisis.
Several empirical studies have focused on the effects of
fiscal policy during recessions or periods of slack. For exam-
ple, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a, 2012b) find that
aggregate U.S. multipliers are larger during recessions than
in expansions. According to Caggiano et al. (2015), this is
even more the case in deep recessions. Fazzari, Morley, and
Panovska (2015) find larger and more persistent government
spending multipliers in periods of low-capacity utilization,
while Jordà and Taylor (2015) show that fiscal consolida-
tions translate in stronger output declines when implemented
in a slump.13 At the regional level, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014), Brückner and Tuladhar (2014), and Serrato and Win-
gender (2016) all document a larger multiplier during periods
of economic slack.
The left panel of figure 5 shows the incidence of state-level
recessions in our sample. It shows the percentage of U.S.
states experiencing a recession at each quarter of the sample
period, where recessions are defined as a negative state-level,
real quarter-on-quarter GDP growth for at least two consecu-
tive quarters. For example, 80% of the states were experienc-
ing a downturn during the Great Recession between 2008Q1
and 2009Q2, while the remaining 20% were not. Also outside
13Using more than a century of U.S. data, Ramey and Zubairy (2018) find
that this is the case only for government spending shocks that are identified
with the Blanchard-Perotti approach, not for military spending news shocks.
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this period, several states experienced a prolonged decline in
real GDP. For example, in the second half of 2012, nearly 60%
of the states suffered a drop in activity of at least two consec-
utive quarters. Overall, the frequency of recessions has been
26% in the sample period. This could result in heterogeneous
multipliers.
In the empirical analysis, we make a distinction between
recessions and deep recessions, where the latter are defined
as periods in which the drop of real GDP was greater than the
sample average decline for at least two quarters. The deep re-
cessions are also shown in the left panel of figure 5 (red bars)
and account for approximately one-third of all recessions (7%
of all sample observations). This simple split-up allows us to
examine the influence of the intensity of a recession on state
government spending multipliers. This can be motivated by
the findings of Caggiano et al. (2015) at the aggregate level. In
addition, the intensity of financial frictions and the financial
accelerator mechanism described in Canzoneri et al. (2016) is
likely much stronger in severe recessions. Besides state-level
binary dummy variables for recessions and deep recessions,
we also report results for a continuous recession indicator as
proposed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b). In par-
ticular, we employ a transition function based on smoothed
GDP growth that assigns probability weights between 0 and
1 for being in a recession.14
Household debt. Theoretical studies have more recently
advanced the idea that private indebtedness may also be
important for the size of government spending multipliers.
Specifically, debtors tend to have a larger marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) out of current income relative to lenders
(Kaplan, Violante, & Weidner, 2014; Misra & Surico, 2014;
Cloyne & Surico, 2017; Baker, 2018), which implies that
they increase (decrease) their consumption much more to
changes in income than others. Higher MPCs, in turn, could
result in higher multipliers. Such a mechanism has been for-
mally demonstrated by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and
Andrés et al. (2015) by assuming that debtors face binding
borrowing constraints. In Kaplan et al. (2014) and Kaplan
and Violante (2014), instead, debtors who own large illiquid
assets (e.g., houses) may display so-called hand-to-mouth be-
havior independent of the presence of borrowing constraints.
A common implication of these models is that fiscal policy
during the previous decade might have been much more ef-
fective in states with high debt burdens.15
A number of empirical studies indeed find a positive impact
of household debt on the size of fiscal multipliers. Bernar-
dini and Peersman (2018) find the aggregate U.S. spending
multiplier over the past century to be higher in periods of
private debt overhang relative to periods when debt is be-
14I (zit ) = exp(γzit )1+exp(γzit ) with zit= 4-quarter backward moving average of neg-
ative real GDP growth. We set γ = 2.5, which closely mimics the frequency
of state-level recessions in our sample that are defined as two subsequent
quarters of negative growth.
15Some recent studies find that high debt could also be associated with low
MPCs (e.g., Sahm, Shapiro, & Slemrod, 2015; Japelli & Pistaferri, 2014).
low its trend. Klein (2017) confirms this finding for a panel
of OECD countries and the consequences of austerity mea-
sures. Finally, Demyanyk et al. (2017) use cross-sectional
data of U.S. metropolitan areas and find that output is rela-
tively more affected by government spending in areas with
more consumer debt.
The amount of household debt may also result in hetero-
geneous multipliers across states. Private indebtedness has
indeed been very different across states. This is illustrated
in the right panel of figure 5, which summarizes the vari-
ation of household debt across states in our sample period.
The information is based on the second recently released data
source that we use in this paper, the Consumer Credit Panel
of the FRBNY. The data are annual. Household indebtedness
is measured as the outstanding value of household mortgage
debt in a U.S. state divided by personal income.16 The cross-
sectional average captures the hump-shape dynamics in the
debt-to-income ratio, which went from 60% in 2005 to nearly
68% at the peak and subsequently dropped to 50% at the end
of the sample. Besides important time variation in the aver-
age, the figure documents considerable cross-sectional vari-
ation. At the peak of the debt cycle, there are states with debt
ratios close to 40%, as well as states with household debt lev-
els greater than 100%. The sizable variation in the household
debt-to-income ratio enables us to analyze the existence of
an association between the size of state multipliers and the
degree of household indebtedness in the economy.
Interaction of household indebtedness and the business
cycle. The bulk of the empirical literature on time-varying
multipliers focuses on a single economic condition as a pos-
sible driver. However, it can be argued that the influence of
household debt and the stance of the business cycle on mul-
tipliers are intertwined, in particular for the decade under
analysis. Specifically, households’ borrowing constraints are
typically more relevant during recessionary periods due to
varying attitudes toward leverage and financial accelerator ef-
fects depending on the level of economic activity (Bernanke
& Gertler, 1989; Peersman & Smets, 2005). Furthermore,
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) show that the amount of pri-
vate debt augments the multiplier at times when households
are forced into rapid deleveraging. Such deleveraging was
exactly what was happening and a key source of the (deep)
recessions in many states in the sample period (Mian & Sufi,
2010). For example, Demyanyk et al. (2017) find larger mul-
tipliers in metropolitan areas with higher consumer debt in
the (deleveraging) period 2007 to 2009, but not for the period
2003 to 2005. Kaplan and Violante (2014) find that a severe
recession leads to a reduction of hand-to-mouth behavior by
wealthy households, which in turn leads to a smaller aggre-
gate consumption reaction following a fiscal spending shock.
16Mortgage debt provides a better link to economic theory than total
household debt (which also includes credit card debt, auto loans, and student
debt). Notice, however, that mortgage debt accounts by far for the largest
share of total household debt. In addition, our results are robust to the use
of total household debt.
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By focusing on both level of household debt and the stance
of the business cycle, and their interaction, we can assess the
possible mutual influence of these factors on the size of the
multiplier.
B. Empirical Specification
To investigate the joint role played by recessions and
household debt in affecting the size of state government
spending multipliers, we allow the model in equation (1) to
linearly depend on the state of the business cycle cit−1 and































+ γh(L) ˜ctrit + γch(L)cit−1 ˜ctrit + γdh (L)dit−1 ˜ctrit
+ γinth (L)cit−1dit−1 ˜ctrit + αih + δth + εit+h, (5)
where
∑h
l=0 g̃it+l , cit−1
∑h
l=0 g̃it+l , dit−1
∑h
l=0 g̃it+l , cit−1dit−1∑h
l=0 g̃it+l are instrumented by shockit , cit−1shockit ,
dit−1shockit , and cit−1dit−1shockit .18 As Ozer Balli and
Sørensen (2013) suggested, the right-hand-side variables are
all centered around relative means in the estimations, that is,
the grand mean adjusted for each state i and at each point in
time t by the respective state and time group means, which
is mathematically equivalent to employing a fixed-effects es-
timator. The demeaning of the regressors allows the explo-
ration of the same variation used for the estimation of the
baseline multiplier while making the estimation robust to the
presence of state and/or time-varying slopes.19 In equation
(5), βh measures the average multiplier, that is, the multiplier
17The use of one-period lagged economic state variables guarantees that
they are not endogenously affected by the shock. We also add the variables
cit−1, dit−1 and their interaction as regressors, which is standard in multiple
regression models with interaction terms.
18As discussed in section II, our identification approach assumes that
government spending does not react instantaneously to macroeconomic
shocks. This also applies to the state-dependent multipliers reported in this
section. A potential caveat raised by a referee is that large and persistent
shortfalls in states’ revenues, which is typically the case in (deep) recessions,
could force states to take extraordinary measures, such as cutting back
spending to balance their budgets. Notice, however, that this could distort
the results of the estimations only if the reduction in spending occurs within
the same quarter of the decline in economic activity, which is not likely
the case. Due to weak instrument problems (extreme low F -statistics for
several horizons) and error bands that explode, it is not possible to assess
the robustness of the results in this section using scaled federal government
spending shocks.
19Notice that for the estimation of the average (linear) multiplier in
section II, a centering of the variables around relative means produces
exactly the same results as those reported. Formally, a generic panel
data regression yit = αi + δt + βxit + uit is equivalent to yit = α′i + δ′t +
β (xit − xi. − x.t + x..) + uit or (yit − yi. − y.t + y..) = β(xit − xi. − x.t +
x..) + uit .
for a situation when both economic state indicators are at their
mean. βch and β
d
h are the additional effects associated with, re-
spectively, a recession and a 1-standard deviation change in
household debt, assuming that the other indicator is at its
mean, while βinth measures the additional effects associated
with a 1-standard deviation change in household debt while
being in a recession.20 In the figures that follow, we report
linear combinations of these coefficients to summarize the
results.
C. Results
Figure 6 shows the influence of (deep) recessions and
household indebtedness on cumulative government spending
multipliers. In each graph, the blue line represents the point
estimate, whereas the bands show the 68% and the 90% confi-
dence intervals based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.21 To
be comparable to existing studies and to offer useful bench-
marks for policymakers, we convert the estimated parameters
of equation (5) to specific situations. 22 More specifically, we
show the average multiplier in, respectively, a (deep) reces-
sion and expansions (outside deep recession) for a situation
where household debt is at its sample mean. For both phases
of the business cycle, we also show the additional impact on
the cumulative multiplier of a 1-standard deviation increase
of household debt from the sample mean. The right-hand part
of the figure depicts the estimated differences with confidence
bands.
The results reveal considerable heterogeneity of govern-
ment spending multipliers within the sample period. In ex-
pansions, multipliers have been around 1 on impact in order
to gradually decline at longer horizons. The magnitudes and
dynamics of multipliers in (deep) recessions are, however,
very different. Specifically, we obtain multipliers that are be-
tween 1.5 and 2 in recessions. In contrast to expansionary pe-
riods, multipliers remain at this level over the entire two-year
horizon. A possible explanation of more persistent output ef-
fects of fiscal policy shocks initiated during recessions may
be hysteresis effects (Delong & Summers, 2012). As can be
observed in figure 7, which shows the underlying impulse re-
sponses of government value added and GDP in expansions
and (deep) recessions, the dynamics of government spend-
ing is quite similar in both phases of the cycle, while there
is indeed a temporary rise of real GDP in expansions and a
persistent rise in recessions. Furthermore, we find substan-
tially higher multipliers in deep recessions, a finding that is
in line with the aggregate results of Caggiano et al. (2015). In
20For a convenient interpretation of the role of household debt, we nor-
malize this variable by its standard deviation over the sample period.
21Notice again that we do not report F -statistics for possible weak in-
struments because the critical values of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013)
apply only to IV regressions with one endogenous regressor. The statistics
themselves are, however, almost always above 40.
22For example, the multiplier in normal times for a situation where house-
hold debt is at its sample mean is βh − f rβch, where f r is the grand mean
of the variable c (i.e., frequency of recessions in the sample). Similarly, the
multiplier in a recession is equal to βh + (1 − f r) βch.
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FIGURE 6.—EFFECTS OF RECESSIONS AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT ON RELATIVE MULTIPLIERS
Bands are 68% (dark) and 90% (light) confidence intervals. The additional effect of debt is normalized to 1-standard deviation.
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FIGURE 7.—UNDERLYING STATE-DEPENDENT IMPULSE RESPONSES
Bands are 68% (dark) and 90% (light) confidence intervals.
particular, state relative government spending multipliers in
severe recessions turn out to be above 4 on impact and
again remain at such a high level at longer horizons. The
business cycle is hence an important determinant of relative
multipliers.
The degree of household indebtness is also crucial for the
size of state multipliers. More precisely, we find a nonnegligi-
ble positive effect of household debt on the multiplier outside
(deep) recessions, which is statistically significant. When the
household debt-to-income ratio in an individual state rela-
tive to the sample mean is 1 standard deviation higher, the
multiplier turns out to be roughly 0.5 larger. Hence, in con-
trast to Demyanyk et al. (2017), we also find an important
role of household debt in a boom. Interestingly, household
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indebtness becomes a significantly more important driver of
multipliers in recessions. In particular, when household debt
is 1 standard deviation higher, the state’s multipliers increase
by approximately 2 in (deep) recessions.23 In other words, the
results suggest that in recessionary periods, not only the aver-
age size of the multiplier tends to increase, but also its depen-
dence on the degree of household indebtedness. This finding
is consistent with, for example, tighter borrowing constraints
and more financial frictions in recessions, as discussed
in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Canzoneri et al.
(2016).
Overall, these results imply that average (linear) relative
government spending multipliers are not very useful for pol-
icymakers and forecasters in real time. The stance of the
business cyle, the amount of private debt, and the interac-
tion of both conditions should be taken into account to assess
and predict the consequences of fiscal policies on individual
states.
IV. Aggregate Effects of Spending Redistributions
Local multipliers are key indicators to understand if and
to what extent fiscal policy is effective at stabilizing regional
business cycles or smoothing asymmetric shocks. Differently
from aggregate multipliers, however, they are not necessarily
informative about the ability of fiscal policy to affect the econ-
omy as a whole. To understand why, notice that relative mul-
tipliers measure the impact of a shift in relative government
spending on the relative economic activity of a state, holding
national effects constant. A rise of output in one state and a
corresponding decline of output in another state could have a
strong impact on relative GDP, while aggregate GDP remains
constant. As a result, economic studies focusing on aggregate
economic stabilization typically do not attach much impor-
tance to local multipliers.
In section IIE, we showed that spillover effects of govern-
ment spending shocks on other states are moderately pos-
itive. Increases in local spending thus likely also stimulate
aggregate economic activity. However, as Ramey (2011b) ar-
gued, if there are large, heterogeneous effects of fiscal policy
across states, targeted redistributions of government spending
across states might be able to generate sizable aggregate ef-
fects on economic activity. More precisely, the results of this
paper suggest that keeping aggregate government spending
constant, a mere redistribution of spending toward states in a
(deep) recession or characterized by a high debt burden in the
household sector should be able to stimulate aggregate GDP.
In this section, we test this conjecture more directly. To do
this, we first construct a simple indicator that reflects redistri-
bution of government spending from states with potential low
multipliers to states that have likely large multipliers inspired
by the results of section III,
23Somewhat surprisingly, the additional effect of debt in recessions ap-
pears to increase at longer horizons after the spending shock even though
the uncertainty of the estimates is high, while the error bands overlap.
It = Ghmt − Gt , (6)
where Ghmt and Gt are government spending growth in
potential high-multiplier (hm) states and aggregate (national)
growth in government spending in quarter t , respectively. Po-
tential high-multiplier states are those that are in a (deep) re-
cession at t − 1 according to our business cycle indicators.24
An indicator It that is positive hence implies extra redistri-
bution of government spending of potential low-multiplier
states to high-multiplier states relative to the level of govern-
ment spending in the previous quarter, and vice versa when
the indicator is negative. To check the robustness, we con-
struct a similar indicator for redistribution toward states that
have high household debt ratios. The latter are simply the top
one-third of the states according to the average debt-to-GDP
ratio over the whole sample.
Figure 8 shows the redistribution indicators. Overall, the
indicators are quite volatile, which is not surprising since
they are based on relative growth rates of spending. On aver-
age, the indicators based on the binary and continuous reces-
sion indicator are moderately negative: government spending
growth was on average lower in states that were in a reces-
sion in the previous quarter. In contrast, government spending
growth was on average slightly greater in states with higher
household debt, whereas the indicator based on deep reces-
sions is on average close to 0. The latter indicator is also
characterized by a big, negative shift in 2008, followed by a
large, positive spike in early 2009. The strong rise in 2009
reflects the ARRA spending program: government spend-
ing increased much more in states that had a deep recession.
The correlation between the indicators turns out to be rela-
tively low. For example, the correlation between the binary
recession and household debt indicator is −0.09, while the
correlation between the continuous recession and deep re-
cession indicator is 0.29. This should be useful to assess the
robustness of the results.
In the next step, we embed the indicators in a simple
VAR model for the aggregate U.S. economy. Specifically,
we estimate a three-variable VAR containing aggregate real
government consumption and investment, the redistribution
indicator, and aggregate real GDP. The VAR also includes
a linear and quadratic trend and is estimated over the sam-
ple period 2005Q1 to 2015Q4 with four lags. Notice that the
sample period is relatively short. The results should there-
fore be interpreted with caution, but should nevertheless pro-
vide useful insights on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal
redistribution across states. Within this VAR model, we iden-
tify innovations to the index that are orthogonal to changes
in aggregate government spending and estimate the macro-
consequences. In line with the standard Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) approach, we assume that the composition of govern-
ment spending across state does not react within the quarter to
24To obtain Ghmt , we weight the individual state growth rates by their
share in total government spending.
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FIGURE 8.—REDISTRIBUTION INDEXES
The green line shows the redistribution index applied to recessions, deep recessions, the continuous recession indicator, and household debt.
shocks to economic activity. This corresponds to a Cholesky
decomposition with the variables ordered as described above.
The results of the estimations are reported in figure 9. The
panels show the impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation
innovation to the redistribution index, together with 68% and
90% confidence bands. For all four indicators, despite the
relative low correlation, we find a significant impact of redis-
tribution across states on aggregate economic activity. The ef-
fects are economically meaningful. Specifically, a 1-standard
deviation increase in the redistribution index toward states in
a (deep) recession or with high household debt levels aug-
ments aggregate GDP by approximately 0.2% to 0.4% after
a few quarters. These estimates confirm that a regional redis-
tribution of government expenditures across states is able to
influence aggregate economic activity and may be a powerful
tool to stimulate the economy.
V. Conclusion
Relative government spending multipliers are a key in-
gredient for policymakers who want to stabilize asymmetric
shocks and divergent business cycles within a currency union.
In this study, we have used a novel quarterly data set of U.S.
states to estimate the dynamics of state relative government
spending multipliers and their drivers over the period 2005Q1
to 2015Q4. The availability of quarterly data by state, along
with a sizable cross-section dimension and variation in the
data, allows for a detailed analysis of relative fiscal multi-
pliers and their dependence on economic conditions in the
period surrounding the Great Recession. Our benchmark es-
timations show an average relative cumulative multiplier of
approximately 1.3 on impact, which remains stable at longer
horizons after the fiscal stimulus. We also document moder-
ate positive spillover effects of government spending on other
states. The estimates should thus be seen as a lower bound of
the effects on local activity.
In the next step, we have examined whether relative
spending multipliers depended on some crucial underlying
economic conditions of the states. These results reveal that
impact multipliers were on average 1 when a state was in an
expansion, in order to decrease at longer horizons. In con-
trast, we find that relative multipliers were more persistent
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FIGURE 9.—AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF REDISTRIBUTION SHOCKS
Bands are 68% (dark) and 90% (light) confidence intervals. The redistribution shock is normalized to 1-standard deviation.
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and (considerably) larger when a state was in a (severe) re-
cession at the moment of the fiscal impulse, reaching val-
ues above 4. In addition, multipliers increased by the state’s
amount of private debt. The latter effect on multipliers was
even more the case in recessionary periods: states that were
characterized by high household indebtness had a rise in their
multiplier by roughly 2 when their economy was in a slump.
The influence of these conditions on relative multipliers is
hence economically important and should be taken into ac-
count by policymakers in practice.
A lesson that we could also learn from the estimations is
that mere targeted redistributions of government spending
across states may also stimulate aggregate U.S. economic
activity. This can be done by redistributing government ex-
penditures from states with low relative multipliers to states
with large multipliers. By constructing a simple redistribu-
tion index, we provide evidence that implicit redistribution of
government spending within the sample period had sizable
aggregate effects. This finding is a promising avenue for a
more detailed analysis in future research.
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Data Appendix
• GDP by state and industry (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis). The original series are quarterly, expressed
in millions of dollars and seasonally adjusted at annual
rates. State-level GDP is “All Industry Total,” while state-
level government spending is “Government.” The nomi-
nal GDP series are deflated by state-level GDP deflators,
the government spending series by state-level government
spending deflators.
• Personal income by state (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis). The original series are quarterly, expressed in
thousands of dollars and seasonally adjusted at annual
rates.
• Household debt by state (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York). The original series report the stock of household
mortgage debt in the last quarter of the year (Q4) and
are expressed in dollars. We compute state-level debt-to-
income ratios by dividing the original series by personal
income. Since consumer debt evolves slowly, we use lin-
ear interpolation to impute the missing values in order to
have quarterly series.
• Trade partners by state (U.S. Census Bureau 2007 Com-
modity Flow Survey). Trade partners of state i are ranked
according to their importance in bilateral trade of state i.
The strength of bilateral trade between state i and state
j is based on the 2007 total value of commodities that
flow from state i to j, divided by nominal government
spending in state j (averaged over 2007). A state’s major
trade partner is defined as the state that receives the largest
amount of (nominal) exports from state i relative to that
partner state’s (nominal) government spending. A state’s
least important trade partner is defined as the state that re-
ceives the smallest amount of exports.25 Trade-weighted
sums for state i are calculated based on constant weights
of each partner state j capturing nominal exports to state j
of state i relative to government spending in state j. These
weights are scaled to sum up to 1 over all states other than
i. The Commodity Flow Survey was conducted five times
between 1993 and 2012. We use the 2007 data because
these are closest to the beginning of the sample under
analysis and we assume that the trade weights are repre-
sentative for the trade linkages throughout the entire time
period.
• U.S. aggregate data. All data are retrieved from FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
25Given that there are missing values and 0s for some states, we have the
additional criterion that in case of multiple 0s, we take that state among the
several states with a 0 share for which the most important trade partner of i
shows the lowest trade share. This is based on an indirect trade argument.
